underpinnings of the Modigliani-Miller theory itself. If changes in the financial structure of the firm affect the consumption and investment opportunity sets open to economic agents, then the pivotal role played by value maximization in arbitrage arguments may have to be rejected. Leland, Ekern and Wilson, Radner and others have examined this possibility for activity choice in models with incomplete (marginal) spanning and suggested alternative behavioral rules such as the requirement of stockholder unanimity. This is equivalent, though, to assuming that firms have monopoly power in financial markets, and it is difficult to see a definitive theory emerging from such an inherently game theoretic and strategic situation.6 If pricing is complete and value maximization is the goal, then we will have to look elsewhere for a theory of the financial structure.
Implicit in the irrelevancy proposition is the assumption that the market knows the (random) return stream of the firm and values this stream to set the value of the firm. What is valued in the marketplace, however, is the perceived stream of returns for the firm. Putting the issue this way raises the possibility that changes in the financial structure can alter the market's perception. In the old terminology of Modigliani and Miller, by changing its financial structure the firm alters its perceived risk class, even though the actual risk class remains unchanged.
In Section 2 we shall show in a simple example how this phenomenon can be linked with the managerial incentive structure to provide a theory that determines the financial structure and is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller framework. Section 3 describes the features of a general theory and Section 4 develops a somewhat more realistic model than that of Section 2. Section 5 summarizes the paper and considers some possible extensions and generalizations. * This section constructs a simple example that illustrates the rela-2. A simple tionships between signalling and the managerial incentive strtucture in example the financial market. Throughout the paper we will make the usual perfect market assumptions. Assuimption 0: Financial markets are competitive and perfect with no transaction costs or tax effects.
As a consequence, no individual or firm exercises monopoly power in the financial markets and each participant acts as if demand were infinitely elastic at the quoted prices.
Suppose that the market, or the relevant corner of the market, consists of two types of firms, A and B. It is currently time 0 and at time 1, A firms will have a total return (value) of a and B firms will 6 I have some other somewhat more narrow objections to this approach. If there are constant returns to scale in activity choice, I find it difficult to see why the firm would not simply explore the underlying state price system by "local" changes in activities. In this fashion a competitive firm could (presumably at a differential cost) map out what the relevant state prices would be. More telling, though, theories with incomplete spanning really require a careful explanation of what markets do exist. Without such an understanding, it will always be unclear whether or not, even without complete spanning. there is sufficient spanning for a value maximizing efficient equilibrium. For additional simplicity, we will also assume that pricing in the market is risk neutral. Hence, if riskless bonds are traded, then assets will be valued at their expected discounted value. Risk neutrality can be justified at a more primitive level by simply assuming that investors are risk neutral, but it is also possible to base it on the assumption that this sector of the market is small and independent of the overall financial market. Alternatively, we could argue that there are a sufficiently large number of firms of each type as to enable individuals to diversify away firm risk. 
This result is quite robust, and it follows directly from the Modigliani-Miller propositions that valuation will be unaffected by the mode of financing. For example, it would be ineffective for A firms to attempt to inform the market, or signal that they were of type A rather than B. The difficulty is the moral hazard that B firms would give the same false signal, once again leaving the equilibrium one where firms cannot be discriminated. Suppose that there were some activity, XA, perhaps a financial package, that A firms could engage in and that investors would observe and use to infer a value V0(XA) for the firm. If V0(XA) > V0, then (by the initial symmetry) B firms would also engage in XA and realize the initial value V0(XA). In equilibrium, we must have V0(XA) = V0. Equivalently, if a B firm were to follow a policy XB for which V0(XA) > V0(XB), then by purchasing the firm for V0(XB) and using the activity XA (e.g., refinancing it), a financier would realize a riskless capital gain of V0(XA) -V0(XB).
This concept of signalling was first studied in the context of job and product markets by Akerlof and Arrow, and was developed into an equilibrium theory by Spence. It has been subsequently examined (with emphasis on the possible lack of equilibrium) in different problems by Rothschild and Stiglitz and by Riley. The joining of Modigliani-Miller arguments with moral hazard, however, does not seem to leave much room for signalling in financial markets. If the chosen mode of signalling is the financial structure, then since finance is costless, the market valuation function V0Q() will be the same for A and B firms and, as we have seen, the only equilibrium will be where V0A = V0B. In the simple model of this section we will assume that managers know their own firm's type, but have no inside information about firms other than their own. Refinancing by outsiders, including other managers, will be assumed to convey no information, i.e., it will not alter the market's perception of the firm's type. In addition to identifying a role for managers, we also have to specify exactly how they share in the consequences of their decisions. We shall also suppose that manager-insiders actually act to maximize their incentive compensation, M, in (5). This implies, of course, that they will set a level of debt financing, F, at time 0 so as to maximize M. Since in the example there is no productive activity choice available, F is, in fact, the only decision variable at the manager's discretion. The penalty, L, associated with bankruptcy is a penalty imposed on the manager and does not necessarily represent any true bankruptcy cost to the firm, but if there were any such costs, then they would fit into the incentive schedule through the penalty in a very natural fashion.
Given (5) and Assumption (2), the activities of the manager are circumscribed in a number of ways. In particular, the manager cannot trade in the financial instruments issued by his own firm. If the manager were to do so, then the incentive schedule would not be given by (5). Legal rules designed to prevent managers from trading in their own firm's liabilities are generally motivated by the desire to avoid moral hazard problems, but one consequence of such avoidance is a clearer specification of the managerial incentive structure. Disclosure rules on insider trading also serve the function of clarifying the managerial incentive schedule and make it easier for investors to The compensation of the manager of a type A firm, then, will be given by ( 
b < FA ? a, will do, and there is no reason to expect that one pair will be chosen uniquely (or that all firms of the same type will choose the same level of debt). This result, however, is a feature of the simple structure of the model and will disappear in a more complex setting. It is worth examining the criterion (13) with care. If yi = 0, then managers, like investors, will maximize time 0 value. Since they share no consequences of next period's performance, they will be unable to signal and the equilibrium will degenerate into that described in (b) above. If yo = 0, then (13) is satisfied for yL > 0, but oddly we may not have an equilibrium. In this case, B managers will not falsely signal, but since A managers do not care about the firm's valuation at time 0, they also have no incentive to signal correctly to differentiate their firms from firms of type B. What occurs if the inequality in (13) is reversed? Now matters become somewhat more complex and the possibility that there is no equilibrium opens up. This case can be treated, but as the next section emphasizes, the incentive schedule M is itself determined in equilibrium, and as a consequence, this particular problem does not arise in the financial incentive-signalling model. It should also be clear now why equilibrium requires that managers be precluded from trading in their own instruments. An A manager, for example, could raise his compensation by falsely giving THE BELL JOURNAL a B type signal and then purchasing his own stock, or a B type could
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give a false A signal and short his own stock. (Disclosure rules, though, enable the market to use such insider trading as a signal.) Another difference between the financial incentive-signalling model and the job signalling models is that there is no implication of inefficiency in the resulting financial equilibrium. Unlike the job signalling models where the investment in a signal is costly and, therefore, inefficient if signals serve no productive function, financial signalling is relatively costless. If L is only an incentive cost and there are no true costs to bankruptcy, this result will be quite general. In this simple example, with certain returns, even if L represents true bankruptcy costs, it is the prohibitive potential cost that validates the signal and in equilibrium neither type of firm must inefficiently risk bankruptcy to signal validly. O Setting the managerial incentive schedule. Who establishes (5) as the incentive schedule for managers? In one sense this is similar to (and about as embarrassing as) asking who sets the price in a competitive market, but consider the following argument.7 Suppose that the opportunity cost or wage of individuals who might supply their services as manager-insiders is w. If the managerial supply is perfectly elastic at w, and if managers are randomly assigned to firms with no a priori knowledge of firm type, then they will demand an expected wage equal to w. Once assigned to a firm, the manager learns its type and is locked to it.
Suppose, then, that managers are all given a perfectly proportional wage schedule
where (positive) yo and y, are chosen so that yoE{VO} + yiE{Vi} = w,
i.e., the expected compensation equals the wage. Managers assigned to an A firm will, by (15), find it in their interest to signal the market that their firm is of type A. To do so the manager can simply alter ( There are, of course, other alternatives to financial signalling. Without issuing any debt, for example, the A type manager could simply assert his liability of L if return falls below a. I cannot claim to have eliminated such possibilities, but finance has at least one important advantage over the simple announcement. By using debt the manager creates an instrument which is priced in the market and returns on which are realized at time 1. The manager's compensation schedule, (5), is now equivalent to a financial claim on the firm's returns, or, more precisely, a derivative security written on the equity or bonds of the firm (see Ross, 1976a) . Since the manager' s compensation is now directly dependent on the value of the firm's financial claims in the market and equivalent to a package of marketed claims, it is relatively simple to monitor and enforce (5) as the manager's true compensation. Implicit in the argument, of course, is the assumption that this is cheaper than monitoring and bonding an ad hoc assertion of liability.
In addition, while the analysis above provides a more detailed justification for the emergence of an incentive structure such as (5) in equilibrium, it remains to explain why one such as (15) was established a priori. What is at issue here is not the uniqueness of (5) or (15). Obviously these are not unique and are important only in terms of the incentives they give; any penalty structure on bankruptcy satisfying a condition analogous to (13) would do. A schedule like (5) would, I think, emerge from some additional features that are missing from the simple model. If the manager makes activity choices, then some incentive scheme will be required irrespective of signalling needs. Furthermore, the two-period model misses the ongoing nature of the relationship which would act to stabilize the incentive structure over time. There is no reason to believe that the resulting schedule would be linear, but, except for discount factors, it should not change form over time.
To summArize the basic argument of this section, given an a priori incentive structure, the type A manager has a further incentive to modify it in such a fashion as to permit him to differentiate his firm through the financial package. With more types than two, type B managers then respond in such a way as to separate their firms from type C firms, given the constraints imposed by the financing-incentive schedule adopted by the A managers, and so on down the hierarchy. We shall consider a more complex example of this below, but first it might be valuable to examine some of these issues in a more general setting.
A general
U One value of trying to put the analysis of Section 2 into a more structure general framework is that it forces us to think carefully about the essential features of the example. We shall stay within a two- 
where x, is the random time I return of the type t firm. By valuing the incentive claim according to its expectation, we have ignored the preference structure of the manager and considerations of his reaction to uncertainty. This is an important omission since Assumption 2 effectively precludes the manager from participating in the market in the firm's claims. If the manager's risk aversion affects his evaluation of the incentive schedule, this will alter the manager's evaluation of differing financial structures, and without a complete knowledge of the preference structure, the effect of a particular incentive schedule on financial choice will be indeterminate.
There is a large literature on such incentive problems, under various headings, but it generally assumes a knowledge of the manager's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in setting the motivational schedule. We could consider incentive schedules designed to induce the manager to reveal his utility function, but such procedures are difficult to implement. Alternatively, it might be possible to assume a probabilistic knowledge and to develop a theory on this basis, perhaps allowing the manager to signal preferences as well as firm characteristics, but this would take us well beyond the scope of the present paper. We shall use (17), then, and justify it on the grounds that the variable compensation given by M is small relative to the manager's wealth.8
The final requirement is that of specifying the feasible set, A,-of admissible financial packages and incentive schedules. One way to do this was suggested in the discussion at the end of Section 2. For example, A could denote the set of incentive schedules satisfying a constraint of the form of (16) on the ex ante expected return of the manager. The manager would now be free to choose any financial package f that satisfied such a constraint. The term feasible thus refers either to f or M, and as it is always possible to scale the equilibrium schedules in such a way that the manager's actual compensation is arbitrary, generally feasibility will be implicit in the limited financial instruments we permit. 8 Suppose that the incentive compensation considered above is a small portion of the manager's total compensation. If W denotes the manager's total wealth and U his utility function, then
E{[W + M]} _ U(W) + U'(W)E{M}, (i)
and the manager acts to maximize expected compensation. Among its other virtues, this simple procedure requires no knowledge of the manager's risk preferences. In practice managerial bonuses are generally small compared to total wealth, but even to the extent that incentive schemes provide a large portion of the manager's compensation, what is relevant in the approximation of (i) is the variable portion that is influenced by the financial decision. A major executive in the automobile industry might receive a yearly bonus amounting to half of his total compensation, but of the total bonus, the principal portion is determined by the influence of industry effects and overall economic conditions, and the variable portion influenced by the manager's financial decisions is probably fairly small. In the jargon of capital market theory, the bonus is primarily determined by the firm's betas with the market and the industry and only secondarily by the manager's financial choices. (For those who feel that executive salaries strain the credulity of managerial produictivity theory, this provides an alternate-equally plausible-explanation.
Executives receive large salaries to eliminate the need for evaluating their risk preferences.)
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The following definition of an equilibrium coincides with that used in the example of Section 2. (Mo, a, fl Part (i) of the definition specifiesft as the financial package chosen by firm t, given the incentive function M and the market signalling function, a(f), and part (ii) is Spence's rationality criterion that the signal be valid, i.e., that a type t firm give a type t signal. Notice that in contrast with job market signalling models, the incentive function, M, as well as the signalling mechanism, a, is an object of equilibrium. Also, as argued in Section 2, it will be assumed thatf' is formed from the marketed instruments of the firm to 'facilitate valuation and therefore monitoring and enforcement. This will link the equilibrium compensation schedule with the firm's financial structure.
Definition: A financial incentive-signalling equilibrium is a vector
To prove the existence of an incentive-signalling equilibrium is not a straightforward task and we shall not take it up here. In fact, though, as the previous example illustrates, there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. Given the incentive schedule, however, the possible distinct modes of financing are limited. While there are a plethora of different financial instruments, what matters is the set of incentive returns they yield. To be concrete about this, suppose that M is given as in the example of Section 2 by (5). By altering the package of financial instruments that are issued, a firm can arbitrarily affect the probability of bankruptcy, but by simply issuing debt the firm can achieve the same range of possible incentive returns, i.e., values for (5). In other words, given the incentive schedule of (5), debt and equity constitute a sufficient financial package and the incentive effects of any other package will be equivalent to those obtained by some package of debt and equity. More generally, still, in the example the signalling implications of any incentive-financial structure pair (a, ft) will be matched by a particular pair in (5) using debt and equity. (This phenomenon of redundancy is identical to that studied by Ross, 1976a.) In conclusion, the manager of a firm maximizes his incentive return by choosing a financial package that trades off the current value of the signal given to the market against the incentive consequences on that return. In equilibrium, firms are correctly distinguished by their financial choices. What matters, though, is not the particular package chosen, but rather the essential characteristics of the financial package, i.e., its implications for incentives. where F is, again, the face value of debt, then debt and equity will be sufficient instruments in the sense of Section 3. If the type, t, of a firm is known for sure, then its current value will be given by 
where we have assumed that F c t. To find the optimum financial level, we assume the maximum is internal, and differentiating (22) with respect to F yields
Condition (19) for signal validity requires that a(F) = t.
Conditions (23) and (24) permit us to solve for the equilibrium structure.'0 Recalling that F is a function of t in equilibrium, we can differentiate (24) and combine it with (23) to obtain the differential equation 
Since the lowest firm, with t = c, will clearly gain no advantage from signalling, it will set 9 The distribution, Q(t), on the continuum is the probability distribution of types, t, given the exogenous information at time 0. For each firm in this sample, Q(t) would be the probability that the firm has a type less than or equal to t. For example, if time I returns are based on an econometric forecast, Q(t) would be that forecast for all firms in the model. Firms with different forecasts would be lumped into different samples.
10 Conditions (23) and (24) 
Yo to insure that the required financing level will not exceed t. As in the simple example, (28) implies that no manager will wish to give a false signal as long as the probability of bankruptcy is not one. By direct comparison, we also set
which is precisely the form of (13), and implies (29). Now, if the set of incentive schedules available to managers is given by (20) with L as a parameter, a manager of a type d firm will choose a particular incentive structure by setting L at L* where (30) is an equality. This will just permit full discrimination and any greater L would needlessly increase bankruptcy incentive costs."I This completes the conditions for an equilibrium incentive-signalling pair.
As with the previous examples, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevancy theorem holds within a risk class, i.e., given t, value is determined by (21) independent of the financial structure. But, by changing F the manager-insider alters the market's perception of the firm's risk class (or type) and therefore its current value changes with F according to (27) and, by (28), there is a unique optimum level of financing for each firm type.
O Some empirical implications. Let us look at some variables whose values are often cited as tests of the Modigliani-Miller theory. " We are assuming that managers do not falsely signal when there is no positive incentive to do so and, hence, there is still discrimination when (30) is set on equality. We are also assuming that d is sufficiently great so that a c type manager must bankrupt with certainty to signal type d. Note that there is nothing inherent in the problem to assure us that (28) is a unique equilibrium.
If the density of low value firms in the sample is sufficiently small, then there might be another equilibrium with no firms issuing debt. In this case the difference between the average value and the highest value is small, and the cost to a manager of differentiating a firm would be prohibitive. Nevertheless, (28) still describes an equilibrium. Wh-ile it is to the advantage of the managers of the high return firms, acting as a group, to cut their financing level, any single manager doing so would find that his firm value dilutes down to the lower value. (Of course, if low value firms were in elastic supply, with free entry. this problem would disappear.) This is the same sort of structure that arises in the nonequilibrium examples of Rothschild and Stiglitz, and the financial-signalling problem would be subject to the same difficulties if a mutual fund or financial intermediary could make discriminating offers to the market as a whole, pooling intragroup risks. These matters are still unresolved and are further compLicated in our setting by the endogenous nature of the incentive schedule itself, and while they are of interest to us, we shall not pursue them here. As a conjecture, though, I suspect that the problems of nonequilibrium in these models are identical to those that arise in the two-person game with nonconvex strategy spaces. By augmenting the strategy spaces available to the firms, specifically by considering randomized strategies, definitive equilibria might be found. The bankruptcy risk, P, is an increasing function of firm type, t, and equivalently of the debt level F. That the risk should increase with F is in accord with traditional theory, but that it should also increase with t may seem counterintuitive. In fact, though, it is because increasing debt brings greater risks that this can be taken as a valid signal of a more productive firm. The traditional view that higher debt lowers firm value may be correct with true dead weight bankruptcy costs for a given firm, but in equilibrium exactly the opposite is true in a cross section of firms. that the firms in the model are all ex ante identical in that on the basis of exogenous information they each have the same probability of belonging to any given type. A corner garage cannot signal that it is General Motors simply by raising its debt-equity ratio. Furthermore, the above comparative statics hold at time 0. In a continuous time model it is certainly the case that for a given firm, with true bankruptcy costs, value will fall with increases in the debt-equity ratio; in fact DIE must approach infinity as bankruptcy is approached (in a diffusion model). Even without such costs, DIE and V will move in opposite directions. These effects will tend to counter the initial incentive-signalling effects and may make empirical testing more difficult.
5. Generalizations, * Considerable work remains, though, before the incentive-signalextensions and ling model is in a form suitable for empirical testing. First, the model conclusions should be generalized to incorporate the possibility of activity choice by the manager. In the examples, the returns of the firm were specified exogenously to the manager. More generally, the manager faces a production problem as well as a financial decision and must choose an optimal activity from a given production set according to an endogenously determined investment criterion. The interplay between the incentive schedule and activity choice produces some interesting results, but in a perfect market even with incentive-signalling phenomena some Fisherian separation results should hold as well. The introduction of activity choice also imposes a need for a more general treatment of uncertainty in the model. If we retain a competitive financial market, then the valuation rule will remain linear, but in either a state-space framework or a k-parameter theory, the tradeoff between return and risk will influence value. This, in turn, will affect both the equilibrium incentive structure and the resulting activity and financing choices. A number of these extensions are studied in Ross (I 976b).
A third requirement is to specify the model intertemporally, and in continuous time. This would not only provide a natural setting for empirical work, but it would also draw on the current work on option pricing theory. For example, an incentive schedule that gave the manager a stock holding could be priced directly, as a function of the current value of the firm, VO, from the existing literature on pricing call options. Similarly, an option to buy stock could also be priced as a function of VO by considering the option as an option on the firm.'2 Finally, of course, for empirical work the effects of taxation and true bankruptcy costs must be considered.'3 12 am grateful to John Cox and Mark Rubinstein for pointing out this latter possibility to me. 13 The model should also be extended to consider problems in personal or small firm finance as well as corporate finance. In such problems the manager is an owner, and questions of managerial risk aversion become significant. Furthermore, we cannot assume that the manager's compensation is small relative to the firm's value. Much of our intuition about finance appears to be derived from analysis at this level, where the severity of the moral hazard problem is dominant and enforcement and monitoring costs become significant. In an independent paper, Leland and Pyle have THE BELL JOURNAL 38 / OF ECONOMICS Nevertheless, even without these extensions, the simple incentive-signalling model developed in this paper provides a theory for the determination of the financial structure of the firm. The assumptions of perfection and competition in financial markets underlie not only the Modigliani-Miller irrelevancy theory, but also the capital asset pricing models and the option pricing literature. If we must drop these assumptions to build a more realistic theory of corporate finance, then we should also be prepared to develop pricing theories in imperfect markets. The incentive-signalling model, though, provides a role for corporate finance within the framework that supports both the pricing theories and the Modigliani-Miller theory.
